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PLAYING TO A NEW CROWD: HOW 
CONGRESS COULD BREAK THE STARTUP 
STATUS QUO BY RAISING THE CAP ON 
THE JOBS ACT’S CROWDFUNDING 
EXEMPTION 
Abstract: On October 30, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission voted 
to implement the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act’s exemption for 
crowdfunded securities, which became effective on May 16, 2016. Crowdfunding 
technology allows any entrepreneur with an Internet connection the opportunity 
to pitch an idea to a community of investors, which could revolutionize the mar-
ket for early-stage startup financing. That market has largely adhered to a status 
quo in which the strength of an entrepreneur’s network is nearly as important as 
his or her idea—a dynamic that is especially difficult for female and minority en-
trepreneurs who have been largely excluded from traditional sources of early-
stage funding. Crowdfunding may offer a solution. The JOBS Act, however, caps 
the amount that an entrepreneur can raise with the crowdfunding exemption at $1 
million annually. Given how much capital it takes to launch a successful startup, 
this cap could prevent crowdfunding from truly benefitting entrepreneurs. This 
Note examines the startup financing landscape, crowdfunding’s revolutionary po-
tential, and securities regulation laws. Further, this Note argues that Congress 
should raise the cap on the JOBS Act’s crowdfunding exemption to $5 million 
annually so that entrepreneurs relying on it can more likely compete with their 
peers who have easier access to traditional startup financing. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, actor and director Zach Braff launched a campaign on the web-
site Kickstarter to crowdfund his second major film, Wish I Was Here.1 He 
raised over $3 million on the website’s portal, which allows individuals to tap 
into a community of online investors interested in helping to fund a project.2 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Kathryn Shattuck, The Roar Over the Funds of the Crowd, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/13/movies/the-roar-over-the-funds-of-the-crowd.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/6QWG-9EJQ] (providing a background of Braff’s Kickstarter campaign, and explaining that 
Braff launched the crowdfunding campaign because he wanted a degree of creative control over the 
film that traditional film financers generally do not allow). 
 2 WISH I WAS HERE by Zach Braff, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/
1869987317/wish-i-was-here-1 [https://perma.cc/2ADQ-BBT8]; see also About, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/about [https://perma.cc/DW3E-XBGK] (describing the Kickstarter plat-
form). Those who participated in Braff’s campaign by donating received some sort of gift in return, 
including copies of the film’s soundtrack and set visits. See WISH I WAS HERE by Zach Braff, supra. 
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Although the resulting film was not itself groundbreaking,3 Braff’s project did 
shift national attention toward crowdfunding, the innovative way to raise capi-
tal that some argue could soon surpass traditional venture capital financing for 
startups.4 
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act’s crowdfunding ex-
emption was implemented on May 16, 2016, and since then entrepreneurs have 
been able to engage with communities of online investors, comprised of eve-
ryday Americans, to issue securities through crowdfunding portals.5 Title III of 
the JOBS Act, known as the Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and 
Unethical Non-Disclosure Act (“CROWDFUND Act” or the “Act”), creates a 
new exemption to the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) that allows 
startup companies to issue securities through a crowdfunding portal without 
having to comply with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) 
registration requirements.6 Specifically, under the Act, startups can issue up to 
$1 million in crowdfunding securities annually, and individuals are allowed to 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Wish I Was Here, ROTTEN TOMATOES, http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/wish_i_was_here/ 
[https://perma.cc/7TNN-UY6Q] (aggregating reviews from professional film critics, with the overall 
critique being that the film “covers narrative ground that has already been well trod”). 
 4 See, e.g., Chance Barnett, Trends Show Crowdfunding to Surpass VC in 2016, FORBES (June 9, 
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2015/06/09/trends-show-crowdfunding-to-surpass-
vc-in-2016/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20161214204235/http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/
2015/06/09/trends-show-crowdfunding-to-surpass-vc-in-2016/#7d2c034538c0] (estimating that 
crowdfunding could exceed $34 billion in 2015, and noting that traditional venture capital funds in-
vest an average of $30 billion a year); see also Chuck Klosterman, Was It Ethical for Zach Braff to 
Take to Kickstarter?, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/magazine/
was-it-ethical-for-zach-braff-to-take-to-kickstarter.html [https://perma.cc/LD49-9LMF] (discussing 
Zach Braff’s crowdfunding campaign). 
 5 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77d-1, 77r, 78c, 78l, 78o (2012); 
Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Permit Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.
sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html [https://perma.cc/ES5X-6D6Z] (announcing that the SEC 
had voted on October 30, 2015 to implement Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
(“JOBS”) Act starting in mid-2016). The SEC announced that the JOBS Act’s crowdfunding rules 
would be effective 180 days after they were published in the Federal Register. Press Release, SEC, 
supra. The rules were published in the Federal Register on November 16, 2015, which makes their 
effective date May 16, 2016. See Title III of the JOBS Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,388 (Nov. 16, 
2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, 274). 
 6 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Crowdsourc-
ing: Markets for Labor, Rewards, and Securities, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 35, 47 (2015), https://
lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Epstein_Dialogue_2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9NS6-D2RT] (noting that it is “quite clear” that the regulatory scheme for securities offer-
ings is too burdensome to be operable for small ventures); Andrew Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securi-
ties, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457, 1469 (2013) (estimating that compliance with securities registra-
tion requirements can require over 1200 hours of work from attorneys, underwriters, and accountants). 
A “startup” is a company that is formed by one or several entrepreneurs with the hope that the compa-
ny will experience rapid growth and eventually become a much larger company. See John L. Orcutt, 
Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role 
of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 864 (2005) (discussing “rapid-
growth” start-up companies). 
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purchase those securities.7 The Act also includes protections for investors who 
could potentially fall victim to fraudulent crowdfunding campaigns.8 Con-
gress’s concerns about fraud were legitimate considering the Internet-based 
nature of crowdfunding under the Act, as is illustrated by past examples of de-
ceptive crowdfunding campaigns.9 
The purpose of the JOBS Act is to encourage innovation and economic 
growth in the United States by giving entrepreneurs easier access to capital.10 
This is a worthwhile goal considering that an active entrepreneurial environ-
ment has long been considered by economists to be vital to a well-functioning 
economy.11 Entrepreneurs contribute to “creative destruction,” a phrase coined 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A)–(B). 
 8 See id. § 77d-1(c) (providing a remedy to investors who have been subject to a fraudulent offer-
ing); David Mashburn, The Anti-Crowd Pleaser: Fixing the Crowdfund Act’s Hidden Risks and Inad-
equate Remedies, 63 EMORY L.J. 127, 151, 155–57 (providing an overview of the liability provisions 
of the Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act (“CROWD-
FUND Act” or the “Act”)). 
 9 See 158 CONG. REC. S1,766 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2012) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid) (express-
ing concern for investor protection during debate regarding the crowdfunding exemption); 158 CONG. 
REC. S1,781 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2012) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (expressing investor protection 
concerns in response to the crowdfund exemption); see also Press Release, FTC, Crowdfunding Pro-
ject Creator Settles FTC Charges of Deception (June 11, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2015/06/crowdfunding-project-creator-settles-ftc-charges-deception [https://perma.
cc/NGJ2-VQAU] (providing an overview of a recent settlement between the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (“FTC”) and an entrepreneur who allegedly used an online crowdfunding platform to engage in 
deceptive practices). Although the risk of fraud in crowdfunding is not the focus of this Note, it is an 
issue that has attracted scholarly attention. See generally, e.g., Jacques F. Baritot, Increasing Protec-
tion for Crowdfunding Investors Under the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 259 (2013) (focusing 
on the risks of fraud in crowdfunding and how the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) can 
best protect investors); Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the 
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclo-
sure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735 (2012) (discussing the risk of fraud on Internet crowdfunding campaigns 
and arguing that meaningful disclosures are necessary to protect investors); Thomas G. James, Far 
From the Maddening Crowd: Does the JOBS Act Provide Meaningful Redress to Small Investors for 
Securities Fraud in Connection with Crowdfunding Offerings?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1767 (2013) (discuss-
ing the investor risk introduced by the JOBS Act). 
 10 See 158 CONG. REC. S2,230 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Pat Toomey) (stating 
that the JOBS Act “sets the framework for developing a new market in which entrepreneurs can raise 
capital and ordinary investors can invest in new ideas”); 158 CONG. REC. H1,277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 
2012) (statement of Rep. Patrick McHenry) (“[E]entrepreneurship is at a 17-year low in the United 
States . . . so what [the crowdfunding provision of the JOBS Act] does is it enables investors to con-
nect with start-ups.”); see also Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing, WHITEHOUSE.
GOV (Apr. 5, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobs-
act-bill-signing [https://perma.cc/VAS7-628L] (“[N]o matter how good their ideas are, if an entrepre-
neur can’t get a loan from a bank or backing from investors, it’s almost impossible to get their busi-
nesses off the ground.”). 
 11 See David M. Hart, Entrepreneurship Policy: What It Is and Where It Came From, in THE 
EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL POLICY 3, 3–6 (David M. Hart ed., 2003) (explaining a connec-
tion between entrepreneurial policy and a healthy capitalist economy); Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner 
Kraakman, Takeovers in the Boardroom: Burke Versus Schumpeter, 60 BUS. L. 1419, 1431 (2005) 
(describing the “creative destruction” economic concept and how innovation contributes to economic 
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to describe the positive effect that innovation has on a capitalist economy.12 
The concept is illustrated by startups that continue to shake up industries per-
petuating an atmosphere of innovation and creating jobs in the process.13  
Launching and growing a successful startup is extremely capital-
intensive, however, which is why Congress identified that legislation like the 
JOBS Act was necessary.14 Entrepreneurs need easier access to early-stage fi-
nancing in order to bridge the “capital gap”—the disparity between the amount 
of capital required by a startup in its infancy and the amount that investors are 
willing to extend to startups at that point.15 Startups are especially vulnerable 
to failure during the capital gap, prompting some to refer to it as the “valley of 
death.”16 
                                                                                                                           
progress); Orcutt, supra note 6, at 861 (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950)) (providing an overview of economist Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of 
“creative destruction” and its relation to entrepreneurship). 
 12 See Hart, supra note 11, at 5–6; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 1431. 
 13 See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Lessons from ZocDoc, a Health Tech Start-Up That Works, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 30, 2012, 2:28 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/lessons-from-zocdoc-a-health-
tech-start-up-that-works/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3S4H-GSNF] (discussing a startup revolutionizing 
the process of booking doctor appointments); Vanessa O’Connell, Warby Parker Co-Founder Says 
Initial Vision Was All About Price, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10000872396390444097904577535111565440718 [https://perma.cc/F4NE-7ZSR] (discussing a 
startup revolutionizing the eyewear market); Jessica Salter, Airbnb: The Story Behind the $1.3bn 
Room-Letting Website, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 7, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/news/9525267/Airbnb-The-story-behind-the-1.3bn-room-letting-website.html [https://
perma.cc/C3QU-25V8] (discussing a startup revolutionizing the market for travel lodging); see also 
Matthew Diebel, Warby Parker: A Visionary Approach to Selling Eyewear, USA TODAY (Dec. 1, 
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/11/30/warby-parker-selling-stylish-
eyewear-cheaper/70060670/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20160614194714/http://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/business/2014/11/30/warby-parker-selling-stylish-eyewear-cheaper/70060670/] (stating 
that startup company Warby Parker employs 400 people in its New York City office). 
 14 See 158 CONG. REC. H1,277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2012) (statement of Rep. Patrick McHenry) 
(referring to the burdensome “red tape” that the SEC creates for startups that practically hinders their 
efforts to raise capital); see also Mark Lennon, CrunchBase Reveals: The Average Successful Startup 
Raises $41M, Exits at $242.9M, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 14, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/12/14/
crunchbase-reveals-the-average-successful-startup-raises-41m-exits-at-242-9m/ [https://perma.cc/
6SZT-ZT4N] (stating that the average successful startup has raised $41 million). 
 15 Jeffrey E. Sohl, The U.S. Angel and Venture Capital Market: Recent Trends and Developments, 
6 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 7, 14 (2003); Sramana Mitra, Can Crowdfunding Solve the Startup Capital 
Gap?, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 24, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/07/can-crowdfunding-solve-the-sta/ 
[https://perma.cc/5BHP-3PML]; see Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel 
Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1416–17 (2008) (providing an overview of angel investors); Falon 
Donohue, Understanding the “Capital Gap,” VENTURE OHIO (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.venture
ohio.org/uncategorized/understanding-the-capital-gap/ [https://perma.cc/W7SJ-FRMG] (describing 
the capital gap in the startup context). 
 16 E.g., Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 60 (1998) (discussing that a primary reason for business failure is a 
lack of capital); Ibrahim, supra note 15, at 1417; Mitra, supra note 15; Martin Zwilling, 10 Ways for 
Startups to Survive the Valley of Death, FORBES (Feb. 18, 2013, 11:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/martinzwilling/2013/02/18/10-ways-for-startups-to-survive-the-valley-of-death/#68ae93185e40 
[http://web.archive.org/web/20160428155732/http://www.forbes.com/sites/martinzwilling/2013/02/
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Further, the lack of gender and racial diversity in the entrepreneurial land-
scape in the United States makes survival even more difficult for entrepreneurs 
who do not fit the startup financing status quo of primarily white men from 
elite universities.17 Traditional sources of capital for entrepreneurs have histor-
ically been effectively unavailable to women and minorities.18 This problem is 
exacerbated by the exclusive social dynamics in the venture capital market, 
where the strength of an entrepreneur’s network is often as important as the 
strength of his or her idea.19 Although there are financing alternatives to ven-
ture capital and angel investors—the two methods traditionally used by entre-
preneurs to launch new businesses—one study shows that, on average, suc-
                                                                                                                           
18/10-ways-for-startups-to-survive-the-valley-of-death/#1c30b55f5d68] (referring to the capital gap 
as the “valley of death”). 
 17 See CANDIDA BRUSH, DIANA PROJECT, WOMEN ENTREPRENEURS 2014: BRIDGING THE GEN-
DER GAP IN VENTURE CAPITAL 7 (2014) (presenting empirical data on gender inequality in startup 
financing); KEVIN LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION 65 (2012) (noting 
that 8% of startups that receive venture capital funding are run by women); BARBARA ORSER & 
CATHERINE ELLIOTT, FEMININE CAPITAL: UNLOCKING THE POWER OF WOMEN ENTREPRENEURS 1 
(2015) (discussing how being female can be viewed as an “entrepreneurial handicap”); Jessica Guynn 
& Elizabeth Weise, Lack of Diversity Could Undercut Silicon Valley, USA TODAY (Aug. 15, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/06/26/silicon-valley-tech-diversity-white-asian-black-
hispanic-google-facebook-yahoo/11372421/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20161215051334/http://
www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/06/26/silicon-valley-tech-diversity-white-asian-black-hispanic-
google-facebook-yahoo/11372421/] (presenting empirical evidence of the underrepresentation of 
black and Hispanic employees in the technology industry); Timothy Hay, Female-, Minority-Run 
Startups Have Tougher Fundraising Road, Study Says, WALL ST. J. TECH. (Oct. 30, 2014, 8:00 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/10/30/female-minority-run-startups-have-tougher-fund
raising-road-study-says/ [https://perma.cc/87W6-QFEX] (discussing racial inequality in startup fi-
nancing); Michelle Leder, Main Street VCs, INC. (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.inc.com/magazine/
20041201/finance.html [https://perma.cc/T3LA-5PP4] (discussing venture capitalists preference to be 
within an hour drive of the startups in which they invest); Claire Cain Miller, Female-Run Venture 
Capital Funds Alter the Status Quo, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/
business/dealbook/female-run-venture-funds-alter-the-status-quo.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QJC5-
9V52] (discussing the status quo in venture capital that leaves women underrepresented); see also 
TrueBridge Capital, The Education of Venture Capitalists: Midas List 2013 Edition, FORBES (May 9, 
2013, 9:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/truebridge/2013/05/09/the-education-of-venture-
capitalists-midas-list-2013-edition/#25a355c24684 [http://web.archive.org/web/20150910042424/
http://www.forbes.com/sites/truebridge/2013/05/09/the-education-of-venture-capitalists-midas-list-
2013-edition/] (listing the colleges with the most venture capitalist alumni, with Stanford, Harvard, 
Brown, Dartmouth, and MIT making up the top five). 
 18 LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 17, at 65; Hay, supra note 17. 
 19 See Candida Brush et al., Venture Capital Access: Is Gender an Issue?, in THE EMERGENCE OF 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY, supra note 11, at 141, 150–51 (discussing how venture capitalists tend 
to deal with entrepreneurs who are like them, meaning that it is harder to get a venture capitalist’s 
attention without some connection); Alex Iskold, 8 Things You Need to Know About Raising Venture 
Capital, ENTREPRENEUR (July 15, 2015), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/248377 [https://perma.
cc/C7RA-MCSG] (explaining how venture capitalists view an entrepreneur’s ability to utilize his or 
her network as evidence of the entrepreneur’s “hustle,” and that venture capitalists also feel more 
comfortable considering investing in someone who is somehow connected to them); see also 
TrueBridge Capital, supra note 17 (showing the prevalence of alumni from elite universities in the 
venture capital field). 
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cessful startups raise $41 million from those two sources.20 This places entre-
preneurs ignored by venture capitalists and angel investors at a significant 
comparative disadvantage.21 
Crowdfunding has the potential to mitigate this problem.22 Crowdfunding 
combines the far-reaching access of social networking with finance, and there-
fore provides all entrepreneurs, regardless of background, the opportunity to 
pitch their idea to a community of investors.23 The crowdfunding exemption 
under the JOBS Act, however, limits entrepreneurs to raising $1 million annu-
ally, which is an insufficient amount to allow crowdfunding to realize its po-
tential to break the startup financing status quo.24 
This Note argues that the JOBS Act should be amended to raise the annu-
al cap on crowdfunded securities from $1 million to $5 million—the highest 
the SEC is authorized to raise the cap under Section 3(b) of the Securities 
Act—so that entrepreneurs can more easily access capital.25 Such an amend-
ment would help entrepreneurs bridge the capital gap and would further de-
mocratize the market for startup financing by giving all entrepreneurs equal 
opportunity to raise more capital regardless of background.26 Part I provides an 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Lennon, supra note 14. 
 21 See id. 
 22 See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (discussing the revolutionary nature of crowdfunding); John S. Wroldsen, The Social Net-
work and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 
15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 594, 601 (2013) (discussing the transformative power of crowd-
funding, and arguing that the JOBS Act wrongly forces the innovative technology of crowdfunding 
into a traditional regulatory scheme); Zachary J. Gubler, Inventive Funding Deserves Creative Regula-
tion, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2013, 6:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873234686
04578251913868617572 [https://perma.cc/822T-6ENH] (“Crowdfunding has the potential to revolu-
tionize the financing of small business, transforming millions of users of social media . . . into venture 
capitalists, and giving life to valuable business ideas that might otherwise go unfunded.”); Mitra, su-
pra note 15 (discussing crowdfunding as a potential solution to the startup capital gap). See generally 
LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 17 (providing an overview of how crowdfunding is a significant 
technological leap forward in the evolution of how startups fund themselves). 
 23 See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 17, at ix, xiii (describing how crowdfunding is similar to 
social networking and gives affinity groups the ability to financially support its members). See gener-
ally Kristen Dell, Crowdfunding, TIME (Sept. 4, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,1838768,00.html [https://perma.cc/6H9L-XT74] (describing crowdfunding as “one part 
social networking and one part capital accumulation”); Gubler, supra note 22 (arguing that crowd-
funding’s social media characteristics could help fund quality business ideas that may have gone un-
noticed without crowdfunding). 
 24 See JD Alois, Doug Ellenoff Reflects on 2015. Sees Opportunity in Reg CF/Title III Crowd-
funding, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/12/79190-
doug-ellenoff-reflects-on-2015-sees-opportunity-in-reg-cf-title-iii-crowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/
EEF7-VZLY] (quoting Doug Ellenoff, an investor advocating for the JOBS Act’s cap be raised from 
$1 million to $5 million so that the legislation can be useful to entrepreneurs); see also Lennon, supra 
note 14 (showing that the average successful startup raised $41 million before either being acquired 
by a larger corporation or launching an initial public offering). 
 25 See infra notes 211–235 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 211–235 and accompanying text. 
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overview startup financing.27 Part II discusses some of the problems with the 
market for startup financing, including its diversity problem.28 Part III intro-
duces the concept of crowdfunding and how it worked leading up to the JOBS 
Act.29 Part IV provides an overview of the crowdfunding exemption under the 
JOBS Act.30 Finally, Part V argues that if Congress were to raise the JOBS 
Act’s annual cap on crowdfunding securities to $5 million it could mitigate the 
lack of diversity in the startup market.31 
I. THE MARKET FOR STARTUP FINANCING 
One study shows that the average successful startup has raised an average 
of $41 million.32 It is therefore crucial that an entrepreneur has access to the 
various sources of capital available for startups.33 Entrepreneurs have several 
options when considering how to finance their startup.34 The common options 
include debt financing, equity financing, financing through a venture capital 
fund or angel investor, or several alternative forms of startup financing.35 This 
Part provides an overview of each.36 
Debt financing includes traditional bank loans, and is more often used to 
fund small businesses rather than startups.37 Small businesses, in general, dif-
fer from startups by not focusing on innovation or high-growth, and are there-
                                                                                                                           
 27 See infra notes 32–70 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 71–103 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 104–166 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 167–210 and accompanying text (arguing for an increased crowdfunding ex-
emption). 
 31 See infra notes 211–235 and accompanying text. 
 32 Lennon, supra note 14. There are two ideal “exits” for a startup: an initial public offering 
(“IPO”) and acquisition. Id. This study defined “successful startup” as one that achieved one of those 
exits. Id. It found that startups that exited through acquisition raised $29.4 million on average, and 
startups that exited with an IPO raised $162 million. Id. Overall, it found that of the startups that have 
reached an exit between 2007 and 2013, the average amount raised by those startups was $41 million. 
Id. 
 33 See id.; see also Fisch, supra note 16, at 60 (noting that “lack of capital” is a primary reason 
why businesses fail). 
 34 See infra notes 37–70 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 37–70 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 37–70 (describing the current structure of the startup financing market). 
 37 See Fisch, supra note 16, at 60–61 (citing Rebel Cole et al., Bank and Nonbank Competition for 
Small Business Credit: Evidence from the 1987 and 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances, 
82 FED. RES. BULL. 983, 988 tbl. 4 (1996) (explaining a 1993 survey determining that banks supply 
more than 60% of small business credit)); see also Orcutt, supra note 6, at 869–70 (discussing why 
loan financing is generally not appropriate for a startup). An important distinction between a “small 
business” and a “startup” is that startups are innovative in nature and have ambitions for high-growth. 
Orcutt, supra note 6, at 862–23. Small businesses generally include businesses like local convenience 
stores and barber shops, without much innovation or intentions for rapid growth. Id. 
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fore safer investments than startups for banks.38 Thus, private loans are diffi-
cult for entrepreneurs to secure because they generally lack the stability or re-
liability that banks prefer when making lending decisions.39 Even if an entre-
preneur is able to secure a bank loan, however, the cash flow demands on a 
business financed by standard loans generally makes it an impractical financ-
ing strategy for startups.40 
Another option for financing a startup is equity financing, which involves 
an offer of securities in a company that investors will purchase in the hope of 
seeing a return on the investment.41 Equity financing provides a startup with 
capital without the cash flow demands of debt financing.42 There are, however, 
a number of barriers that typically keep equity financing out of reach for 
startups.43 An initial public offering (“IPO”), for example, involves substantial 
transaction costs.44 These include the costs of registering with the SEC pursu-
ant to federal securities laws, which requires the services of attorneys and un-
derwriters.45 Further, a successful equity issuance depends on investors believ-
ing that they will see a return on their purchase of equity in a business; early-
stage startups may therefore struggle to generate enough confidence among 
investors in an offering to make the high cost economically reasonable.46 Not 
until a startup has been able to prove itself as a viable long-term investment, 
generally with the help of venture capital or angel investor financing, does eq-
uity financing become a practical source of capital for a startup.47 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See Orcutt, supra note 6, at 862–23 (explaining differences between “small businesses” and 
“startups”). 
 39 See Fisch, supra note 16, at 61; Orcutt, supra note 6, at 869–70. 
 40 Fisch, supra note 16, at 61. Financing a small business through bank loans is a form of debt 
financing, which means that it will require the business to make payments to the bank, including in-
terest, to repay the loan. Id. In order to make payments to a bank, a business will need a source of cash 
flow coming into the business. Id. Startups often do not generate cash flow in their early stages, and 
therefore the cash flow-dependent nature of bank loans is generally not a practical source of capital for 
startups. Id. 
 41 Id. Investors will see a return on their investment if the company does well, because when a 
company does well the value of its equity will increase. Id. 
 42 Id. Unlike loans, equity financing does not require an entrepreneur to make repayments to the 
investor who holds equity in the company. Id. Some companies that issue equity may make cash pay-
ments to equity holders in the form of dividends, but companies are not required to do this. Id. 
 43 See id. (“The transaction and regulatory costs associated with an initial public offering (IPO) 
are substantial.”); Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1468–70 (explaining the regulatory costs to a registered 
offering). 
 44 Fisch, supra note 16, at 61; Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1468–70. 
 45 Fisch, supra note 16, at 61; Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1468–70. 
 46 See Fisch, supra note 16, at 61 (“A small business without a proven track record may . . . have 
difficulty obtaining the services of a reputable underwriter and, without those services, may be unable 
to market its securities adequately.”). 
 47 See Eugene Choo, Going Dutch: The Google IPO, 20 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 405, 408–13 (2005) 
(providing an overview of the venture capital and IPO process for startups). See generally Conner 
Forrest, Startups: How to Know When It’s Time to IPO, TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.
techrepublic.com/article/startups-how-to-know-when-its-time-to-ipo/ [https://perma.cc/ZC9P-73ZK] 
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 Venture capital financing, one of the most traditional forms of startup fi-
nancing, involves a venture capital fund extending financing to a startup, gen-
erally through several rounds.48 Venture capital funds are a popular source of 
capital for startups because they offer financing before a startup can afford to 
launch an IPO.49 Venture capital financing is a form of equity financing be-
cause in return for investing in the startup, venture capitalists generally receive 
preferred stock in the company.50 
The sophisticated investors who operate venture capital funds take large 
ownership stakes in early-stage startups, hoping to see a return on their in-
vestments when the startups go public or are acquired by or merge with anoth-
er company.51 Venture capitalists, therefore, will often take an active role in the 
                                                                                                                           
(explaining the factors that are important to a startup’s decision to go public, including the importance 
of demonstrating long-term investment viability). 
 48 See Fisch, supra note 16, at 61–62 (discussing venture capital and how venture capitalists in-
vest in a business in its early stages, before an IPO is possible); Chad Brooks, What Is Venture Capi-
tal?, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:16 PM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4252-venture-
capital.html [https://perma.cc/7P85-942K] (explaining that entrepreneurs, whose businesses are “new, 
unproven, and risky” turn to venture capitalists because traditional forms of financing, like banks, are 
generally unwilling to incur the risk). Venture capital financing rounds generally start with a “Series 
A” financing, with follow-up financing rounds (if the venture capital fund decides to continue extend-
ing capital to the startup) referred to as “Series B” financing, and so on. See DEVLYN TEDESCO, AL-
BANY LAW SCH. GOV’T LAW CTR., AN OVERVIEW OF THE VENTURE CAPITAL PROCESS FOR ENTRE-
PRENEURS 1–3 (2013) (providing an overview of the procedure venture capitalists go through when 
investing in a startup); see also Wroldsen, supra note 22, at 585 (pointing out venture capital’s place 
in popular culture after the movie The Social Network based on Facebook’s early growth was re-
leased). 
 49 See Fisch, supra note 16, at 61. 
 50 See Barry J. Kramer & Michael J. Patrick, Explanations of Certain Terms Used in Venture 
Financing Terms Survey, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Feb. 23, 2012), https://www.fenwick.com/
publications/pages/explanation-of-certain-terms-used-in-venture-financing-terms-survey.aspx [https://
perma.cc/AY4Q-3BS3]. Preferred stock differs from common stock by granting its holder some addi-
tional rights and protections, like liquidation preferences, dividend rights, redemption rights, conver-
sion rights, and voting rights. See id. Venture capitalists use preferred stock because those rights and 
protections allow them to maintain control of the startups in which they invest, and there also may be 
tax benefits to using preferred stock. See id. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, 
Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 874 (2003) (examining the complex tax incentives that are partially responsible for the 
predominance of preferred stock in venture capital financing contracts). 
 51 See Kramer & Patrick, supra note 50. Venture capitalists are able to take large equity stakes in 
a startup before the startup goes public because the startup will make small, private offerings of equity 
to the venture capitalist. See id. (discussing the preferred stock rights that venture capitalist generally 
take in the startups in which they invest). See generally George Deeb, Comparing Equity, Debt, and 
Convertibles for Startup Financing, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/george
deeb/2014/03/19/comparing-equity-vs-debt-vs-convertibles-for-startup-financings/#36ad9fbb6aa3 
[http://web.archive.org/web/20170204135443/http://www.forbes.com/sites/georgedeeb/2014/03/
19/comparing-equity-vs-debt-vs-convertibles-for-startup-financings/#6ae78fbb5d78] (providing an 
overview of a standard “Series A” round of venture capital financing). 
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management and development of a startup in which they invest to increase the 
likelihood of success.52 
Venture capital financing is hard to come by, however, with some estimat-
ing that venture capitalists decline to invest in all but a very small number of 
startups.53 A venture capitalist’s decision to extend financing to an entrepreneur 
is informed by intensive due diligence about the entrepreneur and his or her 
business, including calculating potential rates of return on the investment and 
reaching out to the entrepreneur’s references.54 In most cases, an entrepreneur 
will need to network his or her way into an introduction with a venture capital-
ist before their startup will be seriously considered for venture financing.55 
Further, venture capitalists generally do not make their funds available for the 
initial growth needs of a startup, which means that an entrepreneur will likely 
have to turn to other sources of capital to operate at least until he or she is es-
tablished enough to be considered by a venture capitalist.56 
Angel investors provide another financing option and have much in 
common with venture capital investors.57 Similar to venture capitalists, angel 
investors take a strong personal interest in the entrepreneurs in whom they in-
vest.58 Unlike venture capitalist, however, angel investors tend to have more 
entrepreneurial experience of their own, and often invest with the intention of 
being more closely involved in the management of the startup.59 Another im-
portant distinction between angel investors and venture capitalists is that angel 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See TEDESCO, supra note 48, at 2–3 (discussing the managerial benefits that venture capitalists, 
who often sit on the board of directors of the companies in which they invest, provide); Dana M. War-
ren, Venture Capital Investment: Status and Trends, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 12 
(2012) (discussing the oversight that venture capitalists like to keep over the startups in which they 
invest). 
 53 See, e.g., TEDESCO, supra note 48, at 6; Bradford, supra note 22, at 103; Fisch, supra note 16, at 
62; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-190, SMALL BUSINESS: EFFORTS TO 
FACILITATE EQUITY CAPITAL FORMATION 3, 13, 19 (2000) (measuring venture capital activity and not-
ing a trend showing that it has become harder for early-stage startups to secure financing). 
 54 See TEDESCO, supra note 48, at 3–4 (describing venture capitalists’ due diligence process); 
Richard Sudek, Angel Investment Criteria, 17 J. SMALL BUS. STRATEGY 89, 89–90 (2007) (explaining 
some of the steps that venture capitalists take as they make investment decisions). 
 55 See Brush et al., supra note 19, at 150–51 (discussing how venture capitalists tend to deal with 
entrepreneurs who are like them, meaning that it is harder to get a venture capitalist’s attention with-
out some connection); Iskold, supra note 19 (explaining how venture capitalists view an entrepre-
neur’s ability to utilize his or her network as evidence of the entrepreneur’s “hustle,” and that venture 
capitalists also feel more comfortable considering investing in someone who is somehow connected to 
them). 
 56 Fisch, supra note 16, at 62. The period of time between a startup is formed and the time that it 
has established a potential success is known as the “seed stage.” Id. At this point startups are especial-
ly high-risk investments, which is why venture capitalists will generally prefer to wait for a startup to 
at least somewhat establish itself before investing. Id. 
 57 Orcutt, supra note 6, at 876. 
 58 Fisch, supra note 16, at 62; Sudek, supra note 54, at 90. 
 59 Sudek, supra note 54, at 90. 
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investors invest their own money, rather than drawing money from a venture 
capital fund.60 
In addition, when making investment decisions, angel investors rely less 
on formal due diligence than do venture capitalists.61 Venture capitalists inform 
their investing decisions with hours of financial due diligence, whereas angel 
investors are more likely to rely on instincts accumulated through their own 
entrepreneurial experiences.62 Further, although venture capitalists have re-
cently demonstrated a preference against investing in early stage startups, an-
gel investors are more likely to invest in a startup during its infancy.63 
Finally, entrepreneurs unable to attract the attention of venture capitalists 
or angel investors, and who cannot rely on bank loans or afford an equity of-
fering, may seek funding through several different innovative financing in-
struments that combine the characteristics of debt and equity.64 These financial 
instruments are referred to as “convertible debt,” and include bridge notes, 
simple agreements for future equity (“SAFEs”) and the Keep It Simple Securi-
ty (“KISS”).65 Each of these instruments begin as a debt instrument, meaning 
that an investor will extend money to a startup similar to a bank extending a 
loan.66 Unlike traditional loan financing, however, investors holding converti-
ble debt will generally not require the startup to make periodic repayments on 
the loan, which means that startups can rely on convertible debt without facing 
the cash flow demands of bank loans.67 In place of repayments on the loan, the 
investor will hold convertible debt on the promise that when the startup issues 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Orcutt, supra note 6, at 877. 
 61 Fisch, supra note 16, at 62 (noting that angel investors are more “informal” than venture capi-
talists); Sudek, supra note 54, at 89. 
 62 See Sudek, supra note 54, at 90 (comparing and contrasting the approaches that venture capital-
ists and angel investors take when making investing decisions). 
 63 See Orcutt, supra note 6, at 876 (noting that angel investors typically invest in startups in their 
early stages); Sudek, supra note 54, at 89. 
 64 See David Sorin & Matthew Uretsky, KISS the SAFE Goodbye? Another Alternative for Start-
up Financing, ABOVE LAW (May 22, 2015, 10:02 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2015/05/kiss-the-
safe-goodbye-another-alternative-for-start-up-financing/ [https://perma.cc/7M2U-DSC8] (describing 
“KISS” securities as a “hybrid” that seeks to “embody the simplicity and ease of use of SAFEs with 
some of the investor protections associated with convertible notes”); Yoichiro Taku, What Is Convert-
ible Equity (Or a Convertible Security)?, STARTUP COMPANY LAW (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.
startupcompanylawyer.com/category/convertible-note-bridge-financing/ [https://perma.cc/EAH7-
5BVV] (providing an overview of convertible debt as an alternative to traditional equity for startups); 
Scott E. Walker, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Convertible Note Seed Financings (But 
Were Afraid to Ask), TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 7, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/07/convertible-
note-seed-financings/ [https://perma.cc/W7UZ-QHZU] (providing an overview of convertible debt in 
the context of startup financing). 
 65 See Sorin & Uretsky, supra note 64 (discussing SAFEs and KISSs instruments); Walker, supra 
note 64. 
 66 Sorin & Uretsky, supra note 64; Walker, supra note 64. 
 67 Sorin & Uretsky, supra note 64; Walker, supra note 64. 
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equity, including a private equity offering as part of a venture capital financing 
round, the debt instrument will convert to equity.68 
Convertible debt may be more palatable to investors in early-stage 
startups because they offer investors the promise of repayment if the startup 
does not live to see an equity issuance.69 Convertible debt can therefore be an 
attractive choice for early stage startups trying to survive, but it is not suitable 
as a standalone form of long-term financing.70 
II. ISSUES FACING THE STARTUP FINANCING MARKET,  
INCLUDING THE DIVERSITY PROBLEM 
The demand for startup financing far exceeds its supply, a fact that has 
had an especially negative impact on minority entrepreneurs.71 Section A of 
this Part explores how this dynamic contributes to a “valley of death” problem 
for new startups.72 Section B discusses the diversity problem in the startup fi-
nancing market.73 
A. The “Valley of Death” 
A capital gap exists when a startup requires cash to operate and grow, but 
is still too immature to generate interest from investors.74 Although venture 
capitalists often do invest in early-stage startups, the startup will nonetheless 
need some source of capital to sustain itself from formation until the point that 
it strikes a deal with a venture capitalist (or some other type of financier); the 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Scott E. Walker, Convertible Note Seed Financings: Econ 101 for Founders, TECHCRUNCH 
(Apr. 21, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/21/convertible-note-seed-financings-econ-101/ [https://
perma.cc/CDW5-YXV5] (providing an overview of the convertible debt conversion process). 
 69 See Scott E. Walker, Convertible Note Seed Financings: Founders Beware!, TECHCRUNCH 
(May 13, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/05/13/convertible-note-seed-financings-part-3/ [https://
perma.cc/969Z-F8QA] (discussing what happens to convertible debt if it does not convert). 
 70 Id.; see Adam Levine-Weinberg, Why Convertible Bonds Can Be Very Expensive, MOTLEY 
FOOL (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/11/11/why-convertible-bonds-
can-be-very-expensive.aspx [https://perma.cc/GY5H-6PWX] (describing the hidden costs and risks of 
convertible debt, including the risk of diluting the upside for other investors in a startup, to explain 
why startups should not rely heavily on convertible debt). 
 71 See infra notes 74–103 and accompanying text. 
 72 See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 73 See infra notes 79–103 and accompanying text. 
 74 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 53, at 3, 13 (discussing the unmet need 
for financing among entrepreneurs seeking between $250,000 and $5 million); Ibrahim, supra note 
15, at 1416–17 (discussing how the capital gap is a problem that especially affects startups in their 
earliest stages); Sohl, supra note 15, at 14–15 (providing background information regarding the capital 
gap problem); Donohue, supra note 15 (providing an overview of the capital gap); Mitra, supra note 
15 (discussing how 99% of entrepreneurs find themselves rejected by venture capitalists and angel 
investors). 
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capital gap exists in that window.75 Angel investors are the most likely type of 
startup investor to fill this gap, but their involvement is insufficient to address 
the overall capital gap felt by startups across the country.76 The capital gap for 
startups generally affects entrepreneurs who are looking for up to $2 million.77 
A startup stuck in the capital gap is extremely vulnerable to failure, which is 
why some refer to it as the “valley of death.”78 
B. The Diversity Problem 
With evidence suggesting that venture capitalists and angel investors reject 
nearly all the entrepreneurs who apply for financing, and evidence that all entre-
preneurs are vulnerable to the threats posed by the capital gap, there is clearly an 
unmet need in the market for startup financing.79 Evidence further suggests that 
women and minorities are disproportionately ignored by traditional forms of 
startup financing.80 This is a problem because successful startups need signifi-
cant amounts of capital, and therefore those entrepreneurs who are overlooked 
by traditional sources of startup financing are at a serious disadvantage.81 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Ibrahim, supra note 15, at 1417. Venture capitalists want to invest in early-stage startups 
because it maximizes their chances of significant returns if they get involved on the ground floor. See 
id. Nevertheless, early-stage startups are risky investments, so a venture capitalist will also want to 
wait to invest money in a startup for as long as possible to still also enjoy the ground floor returns, and 
that is why a capital gap forms. See id. 
 76 See id. at 1420 (discussing how angels can be beneficial to startups who need operating capital 
until they can attract venture capital); Mitra, supra note 15 (pointing out that 99% of startups are “out-
side the realm” of angel investors’ networks). 
 77 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 53, at 3, 13; Ibrahim, supra note 15, at 
1417; Mitra, supra note 15. 
 78 See Zwilling, supra note 16 (discussing the “valley of death”); Definition of Death Valley Curve, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/death-valley-curve.asp [https://perma.cc/NN4D-
HJ9B]; see also Fisch, supra note 16, at 60 (pointing out that lack of capital is second only to man-
agement error as the major cause for business failure). 
 79 See ORSER & ELLIOTT, supra note 17, at 134 (“Angels typically reject 97 percent of proposals, 
three out of four at first sight.”); TEDESCO, supra note 48, at 3 (citing THEODORE M. HAGELIN, 
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION LAW AND PRACTICE: CASES AND MATERIALS 1257 (2011)) (stating that 
only 1% of entrepreneurs who apply for venture capital financing are accepted); Fisch, supra note 16, 
at 63 (“[F]unding availability for small business is often viewed as inadequate”); see also Ibrahim, 
supra note 15, at 1417 (explaining the “capital gap”); Mitra, supra note 15 (discussing crowdfunding 
as a potential solution to the capital gap); Zwilling, supra note 16 (referring to the capital gap as the 
“valley of death”). 
 80 See BRUSH, supra note 17, at 7–8 (providing statistics that highlight how little funding women 
receive from venture capitalists); LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 17, at 65 (noting the gender ine-
quality in venture capital financing and citing a study that showed that only 8% of startups that receive 
venture capital funding are run by women); ORSER & ELLIOTT, supra note 17, at 1 (“[B]eing female is 
too often deemed an entrepreneurial handicap.”); Hay, supra note 17; Leder, supra note 17 (noting 
that venture capitalists prefer to be within an hour drive of the startups in which they invest). 
 81 See Fisch, supra note 16, at 59–64 (discussing how a lot of sources of capital are not practical 
for startups); Lennon, supra note 14 (referring to a study that showed that startups that achieve suc-
cessful exits raise $41 million on average). 
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1. Women 
The gender inequality in the startup financing ecosystem is apparent both 
in the lack of women entrepreneurs receiving financing and in the lack of 
women representing the firms that extend financing.82 Although forty-five per-
cent of venture capital employees are women, most of those jobs are adminis-
trative, and only eleven percent of those in decision-making, partner-level po-
sitions at venture capital firms are women.83 This disparity made headlines in 
2012, when Ellen Pao filed a lawsuit against a prominent Silicon Valley ven-
ture capital firm, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, for gender discrimina-
tion.84 Although Pao’s suit was ultimately unsuccessful, it did shed light on and 
elicit discussion about the “entrepreneurial handicap” that some women face in 
the startup financing market.85 
From the entrepreneur side, women have a harder time securing venture 
capital to finance their startups.86 One study shows that between 1991 and 
1996 only 2% out of the $33 billion invested by venture capitalists was used to 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See Davey Alba, The Gender Problem in Venture Capital Is Really, Really Bad, WIRED (Mar. 
20, 2015, 2:39 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/03/gender-problem-venture-capital-really-really-
bad/ [https://perma.cc/PCF4-3MCH] (noting that 77% to 79% of venture capital firms have never 
included in their portfolios a company with a woman serving on the board); Monica Leas & Julie 
Oberweis, Venture Capital’s Next Venture? Women, TECHCRUNCH (June 3, 2015), http://techcrunch.
com/2015/06/03/venture-capitals-next-venture/ [https://perma.cc/SM6Q-WTXJ] (“The reality is that 
women make up as little as 4 percent of deal-making venture capitalists in [Silicon Valley].”). 
 83 Jessica Guynn, Small Venture Firm, Big Mission: Diversity, USA TODAY (Jan. 11, 2017), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/01/11/charles-hudson-precursor-ventures-diversity/
96446316/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20170202035446/http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/
2017/01/11/charles-hudson-precursor-ventures-diversity/96446316/]. 
 84 See David Streitfeld, Ellen Pao Loses Silicon Valley Bias Case Against Kleiner Perkins, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/technology/ellen-pao-kleiner-perkins-
case-decision.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/WKB7-YVRX]. 
 85 See ORSER & ELLIOTT, supra note 17, at 1 (noting the “entrepreneurial handicap” faced by 
women); Vikas Bajaj, Venture Capital’s Boys’ Club on Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/opinion/venture-capitals-boys-club-on-trial.html [https://perma.cc/
B9L5-Y35Q] (using Ellen Pao’s lawsuit as an opportunity to discuss the gender disparity in venture 
capital, and arguing that it makes it harder for diverse entrepreneurs to get noticed, to the detriment of 
venture capital fund returns); Frederic Paul, What the Kleiner Perkins Lawsuit Decision Says About 
Gender Discrimination in Silicon Valley, NETWORKWORLD (Mar. 30, 2015, 7:31 AM), http://www.
networkworld.com/article/2903327/careers/what-the-kleiner-perkins-lawsuit-decision-says-about-
gender-discrimination-in-silicon-valley.html [https://perma.cc/396Y-BCJQ] (discussing how Pao’s 
gender discrimination lawsuit, which was unsuccessful, nonetheless raised valid concerns about how 
women are treated in the venture capital industry). 
 86 See BRUSH, supra note 17, at 3 (quoting a female venture capitalist discussing what she per-
ceives as an unspoken bias in the male-centric venture capital community); Brush et al., supra note 
19, at 144 (citing the “Diana Project,” a study that uses data from the National Venture Capital Asso-
ciation to examine gender disparity in startup financing); Jonathan Sherry, A Data-Driven Look at 
Diversity in Venture Capital and Startups, CB INSIGHTS (June 15, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/
blog/venture-capital-diversity-data/ [https://perma.cc/EJL8-Z4RY] (collecting statistics regarding the 
lack of diversity in the market for startup financing). 
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finance startups led by women.87 Another study shows that from 2011 to 2013 
only 15% of all startups funded by venture capital had a woman on the execu-
tive team, and only 2.7% of them had a female CEO.88 
Some economic psychologists have proposed that this disparity can be at-
tributed in part to female entrepreneurs being more risk-averse than male en-
trepreneurs, but more recent studies have shown that such a theory is outdated 
and untrue.89 Even if venture capitalists are not explicitly discriminating 
against female entrepreneurs, there is clearly evidence of a bias toward male-
run startups that has perpetuated this disparity.90  
Another counterargument may be that the science, technology, and engi-
neering, and mathematics (“STEM”) fields, where many technology and life 
sciences entrepreneurs are bred, are dominated by men.91 Statistics show, how-
ever, that the STEM field is closer to gender equality than many believe, which 
would therefore not explain the stark difference between the attention that 
male and female entrepreneurs receive from financiers.92 
2. Minorities 
Racial minorities have had limited access to capital necessary to start 
businesses for generations.93 It is therefore unsurprising that racial minorities 
are largely underrepresented in the venture capital world.94 CB Insights, a firm 
that compiles and analyzes data on venture capital and startup activity, released 
a study that revealed that from January 2010 to June 2010, only 1% of found-
ers who received seed or Series A financing from venture capitalists were 
black.95 12% were Asian, 7% were listed as “other race,” and 87% of founders 
were white.96 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Brush et al., supra note 19, at 144. 
 88 BRUSH, supra note 17, at 7. 
 89 See ORSER & ELLIOTT, supra note 17, at 129. 
 90 See BRUSH, supra note 17, at 2–3, 5. 
 91 See Denise Cummins, Why the STEM Gender Gap Is Overblown, PBS (Apr. 17, 2015, 1:45 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/truth-women-stem-careers/ [https://perma.cc/6LPC-P8CF] 
(providing statistics to show that the STEM field is closer to gender equality than many believe it to be). 
 92 See id. 
 93 See Timothy Bates, Minority Business Assistance Programs Are Not Designed to Produce 
Minority Business Development, in THE EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY, supra note 11, 
at 155, 156–57 (proving a brief history of minorities limited access to business capital in the United 
States). 
 94 See Sherry, supra note 86 (analyzing racial diversity in the venture capital and startup indus-
tries, and finding that of the startup founders included in the study, 87% were white); Marty Zwilling, 
Who Is Getting Venture Capital Money This Year?, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/marty-zwilling/who-is-getting-venture-ca_b_668826.html [https://perma.cc/
B27E-74SB] (explaining and providing commentary on the CB Insights presentation on the lack of 
diversity in the startup world). 
 95 Sherry, supra note 86. 
 96 Id. 
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Minorities are also underrepresented on the investor side.97 Only 3% of 
those working in venture capital are black, and only 4% are Latino.98 One sur-
vey found that of the 217 venture capital firms with over 2500 employees, 
none of them had a black partner.99 
Racial disparity is as stark in the broader technology industry as it is in 
startup financing.100 In 2014, data released by some of the most prominent and 
powerful technology companies in the United States revealed that black and 
Hispanic employees are significantly outnumbered by their white peers.101 
Black employees made up 3% of Google’s staff, 2% of Facebook and Yahoo!’s 
staff, and 7% of Apple’s staff.102 Hispanic employees made up 2% of Google’s 
staff, 4% of Facebook and Yahoo!’s staff, and 11% of Apple’s staff.103 
III. CROWDFUNDING BEFORE THE JOBS ACT 
In 2012, Congress passed the JOBS Act into law with the hope that it 
would make it easier for entrepreneurs to raise the capital they need to launch 
new businesses.104 Title III of the JOBS Act, the CROWDFUND Act, creates a 
new exemption to the securities registration laws for entrepreneurs who use an 
Internet crowdfunding portal to sell equity in their companies, subject to limita-
tions.105 Section A of this Part provides an overview of crowdfunding.106 Section 
B describes the five major models of crowdfunding campaigns.107 Section C 
describes some of the events and legislative history that lead to the JOBS Act.108 
A. What Is Crowdfunding? 
Crowdfunding is the process through which an individual or organization 
raises funds for a business or project by initiating an open campaign to reach a 
large number of investors, with each contributing a small amount of capital to 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Guynn, supra note 83 (discussing racial diversity in the venture capital market). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. One new venture capital firm, Precursor Ventures, has gained attention for making diversity 
its mission. See id. Charles Hudson, who runs the firm, has made over fifty investments; 31% of the 
companies receiving funding from his firm have at least one female founder, 16% have a black found-
er, and 7% have a self-identified Hispanic founder. Id. 
 100 See Guynn & Weise, supra note 17. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012); 158 CONG. REC. S2,230 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (state-
ment of Sen. Pat Toomey) (advocating for the JOBS Act as a way to make it easier for innovators to 
raise capital); 158 CONG. REC. H1,277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2012) (statement of Rep. Patrick McHenry) 
(advocating for the JOBS Act as a way to make it easier for investors to connect with startups). 
 105 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(a)(6), § 77d-1. 
 106 See infra noes 109–116 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 117–136 and accompanying text. 
 108 See infra notes 137–166 and accompanying text. 
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support the goal.109 As a concept, Crowdfunding projects is not new, but the 
term as it is now used can be traced back to 2006.110 Modern crowdfunding 
largely happens through Internet portals, blending social networking with capi-
tal raising.111 Popular online crowdfunding portals include Kickstarter, Indigo-
go, and GoFundMe.112 
Crowdfunding has become more popular among entrepreneurs in the last 
five years.113 In 2010, $880 million was reportedly raised online through 
crowdfunding.114 In 2014, $16 billion was crowdfunded online, and its esti-
mated total for 2015 is $34 billion.115 That means that future reports may show 
that 2016 was the first year that crowdfunding surpassed traditional venture 
capital financing.116 
B. Five Types of Crowdfunding 
There are five basic models of crowdfunding: the donation model, the re-
ward model, the pre-purchase model, the lending model, and the equity mod-
                                                                                                                           
 109 See Crowdfunding: Connecting Investors and Job Creators: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
TARP, Financial Services and Bailout of Public and Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight 
& Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) [hereinafter Crowdfunding Hearing] (statement of Rep. Pat-
rick McHenry) (defining crowdfunding as “essentially the ability of individuals to pool their money in 
support of a common cause” during a hearing about crowdfunding); LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 
17, at ix (defining crowdfunding as raising capital through a network of people, generally through the 
Internet); Paul Belleflamme et al., Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd, 29 J. BUS. VENTURING 
585, 586 (2014) (defining crowdfunding). 
 110 See Crowdfunding Hearing, supra note 109, at 2 (noting that crowdfunding has existed for 
generations in the form of political fundraising); Edan Burkett, A Crowdfunding Exemption? Online 
Investment Crowdfunding and U.S. Securities Regulation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 63, 
70–71 (2011) (explaining how modern crowdfunding derives from charitable giving but did not come 
into its current level of popularity until after 2008, and citing Michael Sullivan as coining the term 
“crowdfunding” in 2006); Daniela Castrataro, A Social History of Crowdfunding, SOC. MEDIA WK. 
(Dec. 12, 2011), http://socialmediaweek.org/blog/2011/12/a-social-history-of-crowdfunding/ [https://
perma.cc/5TV6-VGET] (providing a history of crowdfunding). 
 111 See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 17, at ix, xiii (discussing how crowdfunding “shares a lot 
of social networking’s energy” and is “in the most simplistic terms, social networking meets venture 
financing”); see also Dell, supra note 23 (defining crowdfunding as being “one part social networking 
and one part capital accumulation”); Gubler, supra note 22 (discussing crowdfunding’s connection to 
social media). 
 112 See About, supra note 2; About Us, GOFUNDME, https://www.gofundme.com/about-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/8LTF-D3PG]; About Us, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/about/our-story 
[https://perma.cc/2RU7-LLLS]. 
 113 See Barnett, supra note 4 (predicting 2016 as the first year that the amount of money raised by 
crowdfunding may surpass the amount raised through venture capitalists). 
 114 Id. (citing MASSOLUTION, 2015CF: THE CROWDFUNDING INDUSTRY REPORT (2015)). 
 115 Id. 
 116 See id. “Traditional” venture capital financing consists of professional investors, working at 
venture capital funds, giving money to startup companies with high-growth potential. Brooks, supra 
note 48. 
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el.117 They are distinguishable by what the investors receive in return for con-
tributing to the crowdfunding campaign.118 
Investors in a donation model do not receive anything in return for their 
contributions.119 It involves investors making charitable donations, but the re-
cipient need not be a non-profit charitable organization.120 
The reward and pre-purchase crowdfunding models are similar because 
participants in either type of campaign receive something in return for their 
contribution.121 Zach Braff’s Kickstarter campaign for his film Wish I Was 
Here used the reward model of crowdfunding.122 Investors in that project were 
rewarded with a variety of gifts from Braff while he was making the film, in-
cluding journals from the set and casting calls to appear in the film that were 
only open to contributors.123 
Pre-purchase crowdfunding is the most popular type of campaign for en-
trepreneurs.124 Entrepreneurs generally launch this type of campaign to raise 
funds to develop a product, and then promise to send the finished product to 
contributors.125 One of crowdfunding’s greatest success stories was a pre-
purchase campaign.126 Pebble Technology Corp., a wearable technology 
startup based in Silicon Valley that beat Apple to the smart watch market, got 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Bradford, supra note 22, at 14–15 (providing an overview of what investors receive in 
return for investing in each crowdfunding model). 
 118 See id. at 14–24. 
 119 Id. at 15. 
 120 See id. Many donation model crowdfunding campaigns are not organized by formal non-profit 
organizations, but are instead launched by individuals who are crowdfunding for a charitable cause. 
Larry Kim, Most Successful Feel-Good Crowdfunding Campaigns of the Year, INC. (Jan. 2, 2015), 
http://www.inc.com/larry-kim/most-successful-feel-good-crowdfunding-campaigns-of-the-year.html 
[https://perma.cc/3P8N-NREU]. For example, after four-year-old Eliza O’Neil was diagnosed with a 
rare neurological disorder, her parents found a potential gene therapy trial that could help Eliza, but 
the researchers would need $2.5 million to get started. Id. They turned to crowdfunding portal Go-
FundMe.com and raised $380,000 in six months. Id. Now, 26 months since launching the campaign, 
Eliza’s parents have raised over $2 million. Id.; Saving Eliza GoFundMe.com Campaign, GO-
FUNDME, https://www.gofundme.com/ElizaONeill [https://perma.cc/JQB3-SCUC]. 
 121 Bradford, supra note 22, at 16; see also Epstein, supra note 6, at 43–47 (discussing the re-
ward-based crowdfunding model). 
 122 See WISH YOU WERE HERE by Zach Braff, supra note 2. 
 123 Id. Those who invested in the crowdfunding campaign for Wish I Was Here received access to 
journals from the set, t-shirts, opportunities to audition for roles in the film, and early screenings. Id. 
 124 Bradford, supra note 22, at 16. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See Pebble E-Paper Watch for iPhone and Android Kickstarter Campaign, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/597507018/pebble-e-paper-watch-for-iphone-and-android?ref=
sidebar [https://perma.cc/EBA7-GJEK]; Wil Schroter, Top 10 Business Crowdfunding Campaigns of 
All Time, FORBES (April 16, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wilschroter/2014/04/16/top-10-
business-crowdfunding-campaigns-of-all-time/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20170102040220/http://
www.forbes.com/sites/wilschroter/2014/04/16/top-10-business-crowdfunding-campaigns-of-all-
time/#3b9465113218]. 
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its start on Kickstarter in 2012.127 Investors who pledged $99 to the company 
were promised a Pebble smart watch in return.128 The campaign raised $10 
million.129 The company was ultimately unable to maintain its early success in 
the long term and was purchased by another wearable technology company, 
but its campaign is still considered a breakout crowdfunding success.130 
Lending crowdfund campaigns are also known as “peer-to-peer” lend-
ing.131 Participants in a lending crowdfund campaign loan money to the organ-
izer, and eventually receive repayment.132 
Finally, in an equity crowdfunding campaign, an entrepreneur launches 
the campaign and participants receive an ownership interest in the entrepre-
neur’s company in return for their contributions.133 Of all the crowdfunding 
models, this one most closely resembles a securities offering, and is thus sub-
ject to regulation by the SEC.134 Until recently, every equity crowdfunding 
campaign had to comply with the Securities Act’s registration requirements.135 
As of May 16, 2016 and passage of the JOBS Act, however, equity crowdfund-
ing has enjoyed a $1 million exemption from compliance with the Securities 
Act, subject to certain limitations.136 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Pebble Has a New Face and a New Pitch: I’m Not an Apple Watch, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 24, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/24/apple-pebble-round/ [https://perma.cc/
ER2H-5VZX] (noting that Pebble beat Apple to the smart watch market by two years); Jenna 
Wortham, Start-Ups Look to the Crowd, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
04/30/technology/kickstarter-sets-off-financing-rush-for-a-watch-not-yet-made.html?pagewanted=all 
[https://perma.cc/HSU8-37YD] (providing background on the Pebble crowdfunding campaign). 
 128 Wortham, supra note 127. 
 129 See Pebble E-Paper Watch for iPhone and Android Kickstarter Campaign, supra note 126; 
Schroter, supra note 126; Wortham, supra note 127. 
 130 See Steve Kovach, Fitbit Discloses That It Bought Smartwatch Startup Pebble for $23 Million, 
BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/fitbit-bought-pebble-for-23-million-
2017-2 [https://perma.cc/X9DL-ZR5Y] (discussing some of the details surrounding Pebble’s dissolu-
tion and sale to Fitbit); see also Trent Moore, Now That Pebble Is Dead, What Does That Mean for 
the World of Wearables?, PASTE (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2017/
02/now-that-pebble-is-dead-what-does-that-mean-for-th.html [https://perma.cc/D2EZ-E7VM] (recog-
nizing the success of Pebble’s “rock solid” crowdfunding efforts despite the company’s failure to 
achieve long-term success). 
 131 Bradford, supra note 22, at 20. 
 132 See id. The most popular online portal for the lending crowdfunding model is Kiva.org. See 
id.; About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about [https://perma.cc/9KDJ-GRC3]. Sometimes the lender 
will receive interest on his or her contribution to a lending crowdfunding campaign, and sometimes 
the lender will simply recoup the principal. Bradford, supra note 22, at 20. 
 133 Bradford, supra note 22, at 24. 
 134 See id. 
 135 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1)–(5) (2012) (listing exemptions to the Securities Act of 1933 (“Secu-
rities Act”) rules before the JOBS Act); see also Wroldsen, supra note 22, at 596–97 (discussing a 
crowdfunding campaign in 2011 that the SEC decided involved a securities offering and therefore shut 
down for not registering the offering in compliance with the Securities Act). 
 136 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6); Title III of the JOBS Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,388 (Nov. 16, 
2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, 274). 
794 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:775 
C. The Demand for a Securities Crowdfunding Exemption  
and the Congressional Response 
Entrepreneurs could crowdfund securities before passage of the JOBS 
Act, but they had to do so without an exemption from the securities registra-
tion requirements.137 This meant that crowdfunding securities was not a practi-
cal option for startups because registration entails prohibitively high compli-
ance costs.138 
The crowdfunding campaign launched to purchase Pabst Brewing Com-
pany (“Pabst”) in 2011 illustrates why many felt that regulatory reform for eq-
uity crowdfunding was necessary, and helped propel the issue to the floor of 
Congress.139 The Pabst campaign was launched because the beer company was 
actively seeking a buyer.140 The campaign’s leaders, Michael Migliozzi and 
Brian Flatow, created a website, BuyaBeerCompany.com, with the hope of 
crowdfunding the $300 million needed to purchase Pabst.141 They promised to 
repay investors with beer in the amount of their investments and offered inves-
tors certificates of ownership in Pabst.142 They successfully raised $200 mil-
lion from more than five million participants in the campaign’s first six 
months, which is when the SEC served them with a cease-and-desist letter.143 
Certificates of ownership fall within the Securities Act’s broad definition 
of a security, which means that because Migliozzi and Flatow failed to register 
their offering, they violated the Securities Act’s requirements.144 The Pabst 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c). 
 138 See id. (stating that a non-exempt offering of securities cannot be made until its registered with 
the SEC); see also Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1468–70 (discussing the costs of a registered securities 
offering). A registered offering of securities is so burdensome because it demands hours of work from 
expensive professionals, including attorneys, underwriters, and accountants. See Schwartz, supra note 
6, at 1469. 
 139 See Crowdfunding Hearing, supra note 109, at 3; Wroldsen, supra note 22, at 596–97 (provid-
ing an overview of the Pabst Brewing Company (“Pabst”) crowdfunding campaign). 
 140 See Uriel S. Carni, Protecting the Crowd Through Escrow: Three Ways That the SEC Can 
Protect Crowdfunding Investors, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 681, 692 (2014). 
 141 See id. 
 142 See Wroldsen, supra note 22, at 596. 
 143 Michael Migliozzi II & Brian Flatow, Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursu-
ant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist 
Order, Securities Act Release No. 9216, at 1–2 (June 8, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/
2011/33-9216.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NJQ-4TV5] [hereinafter Cease-and-Desist Order]; Wroldsen, 
supra note 22, at 596. 
 144 See Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 143, at 3–4; Wroldsen, supra note 22, at 596. The 
term “security” is broadly defined in the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). It is defined 
so broadly so that the Securities Act’s regulatory scheme can adapt to the “countless and variable 
schemes devised by those who seek the use of money of others on the promise of profits . . . .” See 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555–56 (1982) (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 
293, 299 (1946)); see also W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298–99 (defining investment contract as “a 
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led 
to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party”). 
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campaign likely would have escaped SEC scrutiny if Migliozzi and Flatow 
simply offered contributors beer rather than any type of ownership in the com-
pany.145 The Pabst campaign did, however, draw attention to the power of 
crowdfunding, including, notably, the attention of North Carolina Representa-
tive Patrick McHenry, a Congressional leader in the crowdfunding move-
ment.146 
Beginning in 2010, several proposals were brought to the SEC to create a 
crowdfunding exemption to the Securities Act.147 Each proposal included an-
nual limits for how much an entrepreneur could raise with a crowdfunding ex-
emption, and how much an individual could invest.148 The Sustainable Econo-
mies Law Center, in July 2010, was the first organization to formally propose a 
crowdfunding exemption with its petition to the SEC.149 Its petition recognized 
the difficulties that entrepreneurs face when raising capital, and proposed that a 
crowdfunding exemption could be a “powerful source of grassroots and local 
funding.”150 The proposal was to exempt up to $100,000 in crowdfunded secu-
rities a year for entrepreneurs, with a $100 annual limit on how much individ-
uals could invest.151 
In December 2010, the Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council 
(“SBEC”) made a proposal to the SEC for a crowdfunding exemption.152 It 
advocated for a crowdfunding exemption to help entrepreneurs “turn ideas into 
viable companies.”153 The proposal included a $1,000,000 annual cap on 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See Wroldsen, supra note 22, at 596. 
 146 See Crowdfunding Hearing, supra note 109, at 3 (citing to the Pabst crowdfunding campaign 
in his remarks in support of a crowdfunding exemption); see also Pabst Blue Ribbon Beer Almost 
Gets Bought via Crowd Funding Investing, STARTUP EXEMPTION (June 23, 2011), http://www.
startupexemption.com/archives/110#axzz44s3OcTJo [https://perma.cc/ZV3Q-FJGB] (pointing to the 
Pabst crowdfunding campaign in support of the Startup Exemption’s online petition calling for a 
crowdfunding exemption). 
 147 See Letter from Woodie Neiss, Member, SBE Council Advisory Comm., to Gerald J. Laporte, 
Chief, Office of Small Bus. Policy, Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC 1 (Dec. 21, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/
info/smallbus/2010gbforum/2010gbforum-sbe.pdf [https://perma.cc/49ZM-7ZLE] [hereinafter SBE to 
SEC]; Sustainable Econ. Law Ctr., Request for Rulemaking to Exempt Securities Offerings up to 
$100,000 with $100 Maximum per Investor from Registration, SEC File No. 4-605, at 2 (July 1, 
2010), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2010/petn4-605.pdf [https://perma.cc/K89E-3HM5] [here-
inafter Sustainable Econ. Law Ctr. to SEC]; About Us, STARTUP EXEMPTION, http://www.startup
exemption.com/about-us#axzz44s3OcTJo [https://perma.cc/UC2Q-W4T3] (petition created in 2012 
by a team of entrepreneurs to encourage the SEC to create a crowdfunding exemption); see also Brad-
ford, supra note 22, at 81–84 (providing an overview of the different proposals to the SEC). 
 148 Bradford, supra note 22, at 81–84. 
 149 See Sustainable Econ. Law Ctr. to SEC, supra note 147, at 1. 
 150 Id. at 2. 
 151 Id. 
 152 SBE to SEC, supra note 147, at 1. 
 153 Id. 
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crowdfunded securities for entrepreneurs, and a limit on individual investor’s 
involvement set at 10% of their yearly income, with a maximum of $10,000.154 
Entrepreneur Sherwood “Woodie” Neiss, who authored the SBEC’s pro-
posal, worked with a team of entrepreneurs to co-found Startup Exemption, an 
online petition to Congress to promote a crowdfunding exemption that would 
be available only to startups.155 Like the SBEC proposal, the Startup Exemp-
tion’s petition capped the exemption at $1,000,000 a year, and limited individ-
uals to investing up to 10% of their yearly income, or to $10,000.156 
Congress recognized the demand for a crowdfunding exemption in 2011 
when Representative McHenry introduced the Entrepreneur Access to Capital 
Act.157 The bill included an exemption for crowdfunded securities with an an-
nual cap set at $2 million.158 The House of Representatives passed the law.159 It 
was criticized in the Senate, however, for its lack of investor protections, with 
some referring to the bill as the “Boiler Room Legalization Act,” referring to a 
time in history when investors were pressured into making unsound investment 
decisions while gathered in “boiler rooms.”160 
In response to the “boiler room” criticisms, the Senate’s versions of the 
crowdfunding exemption were heavier on investor protections, including re-
quirements that crowdfunded securities be sold only through funding portals 
registered with the SEC, increased disclosure and investor education require-
ments, and restrictions on resale of crowdfunded securities.161 The Senate’s 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Id. at 4. 
 155 See Exemption Framework, STARTUP EXEMPTION, http://www.startupexemption.com/
exemption-framework#axzz44s3OcTJo [https://perma.cc/V9Z3-A7ZR]. It defined “startup” as busi-
nesses with annual gross revenue below $5 million in the last three years. Id. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-262, at 3–4 (2011) (recognizing the increasing popularity of crowd-
funding and arguing that the SEC’s regulatory scheme without a crowdfunding exemption has a det-
rimental impact on innovation and entrepreneurship). 
 158 157 CONG. REC. H7,314 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 2011). 
 159 See Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 160 See 158 CONG. REC. S1,766 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2012) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid) (com-
paring the lack of investor protections found in the House version of the crowdfunding exemption bill 
to the “bad old days when people gathered in [boiler rooms] and made cold calls to try to elicit un-
wary investors into dubious schemes”); 158 CONG. REC. S1,781 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2012) (statement 
of Sen. Carl Levin) (arguing that the House bill would essentially be a legalization of “the business 
model of unscrupulous boiler rooms”); see also Wroldsen, supra note 22, at 598 (discussing the “boil-
er room” criticisms of the House’s crowdfunding exemption bill); What Is a Boiler Room Operation?, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/04/080604.asp [https://perma.cc/J386-
8DM6] (defining “boiler room” investing as “the use of high pressure sales tactics to sell stock to 
clients” who are randomly selected). 
 161 See Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2011 
(“CROWDFUND Act”), S. 1970, 112th Cong. (2011); Democratizing Access to Capital Act of 2011, 
S. 1791, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Bradford, supra note 22, at 91–98 (providing an overview of 
the investor protections that the Senate introduced into the crowdfunding exemption legislation); 
Wroldsen, supra note 22, at 598–99 (discussing the negotiations in Congress that ultimately resulted 
in the current version of the JOBS Act’s crowdfunding exemption). 
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first version was the Democratizing Access to Capital Act of 2011, and its sec-
ond was the CROWDFUND Act.162 Ultimately, the CROWDFUND Act be-
came the version of the crowdfunding exemption that was incorporated into 
the JOBS Act, which was passed by the House and the Senate in March 2012 
and signed into law by President Obama on April 5, 2012.163 
After the JOBS Act was signed into law, in 2014, Representative McHen-
ry, still an advocate for crowdfunding, introduced the Equity Crowdfunding 
Improvement Act to amend the JOBS Act.164 One of the proposed amendments 
would have increased the annual cap on crowdfunded securities for an entre-
preneur from $1 million to $3 million, with the option for an entrepreneur to 
raise as much as $5 million a year if he or she provided investors audited fi-
nancial statements.165 The bill was introduced in the 113th Congress but never 
received a vote.166 
IV. CROWDFUNDING UNDER THE JOBS ACT 
Prior to the JOBS Act, startups could use the “private placement” exemp-
tion from the Securities Act’s registration requirements, which allows them to 
privately issue equity to the founder’s friends, family, or unrelated wealthy 
investors.167 Compliance with the Securities Act’s regulations for a non-
exempt securities offering, including an IPO, is generally cost prohibitive for a 
startup.168 Consequently, startup financing has traditionally been dominated by 
angel investors and venture capitalists, both of which fall under the existing 
Securities Act exemptions and have enough capital to support a growing 
startup.169 Congress therefore passed the JOBS Act in the hope that it would 
allow entrepreneurs to raise capital more easily.170 Section A reviews the new 
                                                                                                                           
 162 See S. 1970; S. 1791. 
 163 158 CONG. REC. S1,977 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (noting that the bill passed in the Senate by 
a vote of 73 to 26); 158 CONG. REC. H1,289 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2012); Remarks by the President at 
JOBS Act Bill Signing, supra note 10. 
 164 Equity Crowdfunding Improvement Act of 2014, H.R. 4564, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 165 Id. § 301(a). 
 166 See id.; Actions Overview, H.R. 4564- Equity Crowdfunding Improvement Act of 2014, CON-
GRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/4564/actions [https://perma.cc/
4QTH-DD5R] (showing that no vote was held on the bill after its introduction on May 6, 2014). 
 167 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2), (5) (2012). 
 168 See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1468–70 (discussing the costs of a registered securities offer-
ing, which can include over 1200 hours of work from attorneys, underwriters, and accountants). 
 169 See Fisch, supra note 16, at 61–62; Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1473. 
 170 See 158 CONG. REC. S2,230 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Pat Toomey) (stating 
that the JOBS Act “sets the framework for developing a new market in which entrepreneurs can raise 
capital and ordinary investors can invest in new ideas”); 158 CONG. REC. H1,277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 
2012) (statement of Rep. Patrick McHenry) (“[E]entrepreneurship is at a 17-year low in the United 
States . . . . So what [the crowdfunding provision of the JOBS Act] does is it enables investors to con-
nect with start-ups.”). 
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rules introduced by the JOBS Act.171 Section B discusses a company that has 
taken advantage of the JOBS Act to illustrate how the rules work in practice.172 
A. A Look at the New Rules 
On October 30, 2015, the SEC voted to implement the rules proposed in 
the JOBS Act.173 Since May 16, 2016, entrepreneurs have been able to take 
advantage of the Act’s new exemption to raise $1 million annually through 
crowdfunding securities sold to investors online.174  
Investors are limited in how many securities they purchase through equity 
crowdfunding in a year depending on their net worth or annual income.175 Inves-
tors with a net worth or annual income under $100,000 may invest up to the 
greater of $2000 or 5% of their annual income in crowdfunded securities annual-
ly.176 Investors with a net worth or annual income greater than $100,000 may 
invest up to the greater of 10% of their annual salary or $100,000 annually.177 
1. Limitations and Protections 
The Act requires that entrepreneurs crowdfund their securities through an 
intermediary registered with the SEC rather than dealing directly with any in-
vestors.178 Issuers of crowdfunded securities are not allowed to advertise the 
offering themselves, so they must rely on the intermediary to promote the of-
fering.179 The Act creates a new classification of intermediary, called “funding 
portals,” which are subject to a new regulatory scheme established by the 
SEC.180 The funding portals are limited to connecting entrepreneurs and buyers 
of their crowdfunded securities, and may not offer any investment recommen-
                                                                                                                           
 171 See infra notes 173–202 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 203–210 and accompanying text. 
 173 See Title III of the JOBS Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, 274); Press Release, SEC, supra note 5 (announcing 
the SEC’s vote to implement the crowdfunding exemption under the JOBS Act). 
 174 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012); Press Release, SEC, supra note 5 (announcing that the JOBS 
Act’s crowdfunding provisions will be implemented and available to entrepreneurs and investors on 
May 16, 2016). 
 175 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i)–(ii) (providing the limits that individual investors may contribute 
to a crowdfunding campaign based on their annual income or net worth). 
 176 Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i) 
 177 Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii). 
 178 See id. § 77d(a)(6)(C) (requiring that crowdfunded securities under the § 77d(a)(6) exemption be 
sold through a broker or funding portal that complies with the § 77d-1(a) rules for small intermediaries). 
 179 See id. § 77d-1(b)(2). 
 180 Id. § 77d(a)(6)(C); Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, 
SEC (May 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm [https://
perma.cc/9YDU-G64X] [hereinafter Regulation Crowdfunding] (providing an overview of the re-
quirements for crowdfunding portals). 
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dations or advice.181 The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) 
is tasked with ensuring that only crowdfunding portals compliant with federal 
securities laws and FINRA regulations are registered.182 Since the JOBS Act’s 
crowdfunding rules went into effect in May 2016, there are already over twen-
ty FINRA-approved crowdfunding portals in operation.183 
The intermediary has the obligation of ensuring that investors do not ex-
ceed the amount that the Act allows them to invest in a year.184 Additionally, 
the SEC requires that the directors, officers, and other management at an in-
termediary do not have any financial interest in a crowdfunding campaign 
launched on that intermediary.185 Startup businesses that take advantage of se-
curities crowdfunding are also required to set a target amount for the campaign 
to raise, and the intermediary cannot disburse the proceeds of the offering until 
the target is met.186 
The Act restricts a secondary market for the securities that are issued in a 
crowdfunding campaign from forming.187 Investors holding securities offered 
in an exempt crowdfunding campaign are not able to transfer or sell those se-
curities for the first year after purchase, unless the sale is to a family member 
of the purchaser, an accredited investor, or as otherwise part of an offering reg-
istered with the SEC.188 
2. Disclosure Requirements Under the CROWDFUND Act 
To enjoy the new exemption, the Act requires disclosures that include the 
name of the business crowdfunding securities, its physical address and website 
address, its legal status, a description of the business and any anticipated busi-
ness plans, and the names of the directors, officers, and substantial investors.189 
The Act also requires a disclosure regarding the financial condition of the issu-
                                                                                                                           
 181 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)–(b). 
 182 Crowdfunding and the JOBS Act: What Investors Should Know, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/
investors/alerts/crowdfunding-and-jobs-act-what-investors-should-know [https://perma.cc/F54S-
CQFB]; see also Funding Portals, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/funding-portals [https://
perma.cc/67GY-WQUS] (providing an overview of FINRA’s process for registering crowdfunding 
portals). 
 183 See JD Alois, There Are Now 21 FINRA Approved Reg CF Crowdfunding Portals, CROWD-
FUND INSIDER (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/11/92810-now-21-finra-
approved-reg-cf-crowdfunding-portals/ [https://perma.cc/A4SR-VDBG] (providing updates on the 
progress of registered crowdfunding portals since the rules went into effect in May 2016). 
 184 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8); see also Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 180 (summarizing 
the SEC’s requirements for crowdfunding portals). 
 185 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(11). 
 186 Id. § 77d-1(a)(7). 
 187 Id. § 77d-1(e). 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(A)–(H). 
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er.190 The terms of the financial condition disclosure depend on the size of the 
offering; income tax forms and unaudited financial statements are required 
from businesses offering less than $100,000, and audited financial statements 
are required from businesses raising between $500,000 and the Act’s cap of $1 
million.191 Businesses must also disclose how they plan to use the proceeds 
from the offering, the amount that they are hoping to raise, their deadline for 
raising that amount, the offering price for the securities, and a description of its 
capital structure.192 It must also provide updates to the SEC on the progress of 
the offering.193 
3. Protecting Investors from Fraud 
Consistent with the SEC’s fundamental policies, the limitations found in 
the Act are meant to protect investors from fraud while advancing the Act’s 
mission to make it easier for startups to raise capital.194 The exemption puts 
investors at risk because it marks the first time that a company can offer securi-
ties to the general public without complying with the SEC’s registration re-
quirements.195 The Internet-based nature of crowdfunding offerings further 
increases the potential that investors could be defrauded.196 This risk was illus-
trated by a complaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) against 
Erik Chevalier, an entrepreneur who engaged in deceptive practices while rais-
ing money through a Kickstarter campaign to produce a board game.197 Cheva-
lier raised $122,000 from 1246 participants in his campaign, but the FTC al-
                                                                                                                           
 190 Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D). 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)–(H). 
 193 Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(F). 
 194 See 158 CONG. REC. S2,230 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Pat Toomey) (advo-
cating for the crowdfunding exemption as a way to encourage entrepreneurial ventures); 158 CONG. 
REC. H1,277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2012) (statement of Rep. Patrick McHenry) (identifying that entrepre-
neurship had slowed down in the United States and advocating for the crowdfunding exemption as a 
potential solution); Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing, supra note 10 (explaining that 
the purpose of the JOBS Act is to make capital more accessible to entrepreneurs); see also Schwartz, 
supra note 6, at 1465 (explaining that the disclosure requirements included in the JOBS Act are meant 
to mitigate the risk of fraud in crowdfunding); What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/HCR3-UDF5] (explaining that investor protection is a policy driving 
the SEC’s actions). 
 195 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6); see also Hazen, supra note 9, at 1736–38 (discussing how online 
securities offerings marks a departure from standard securities regulation, and the new risks that it 
introduces). 
 196 See generally Hazen, supra note 9 (examining the JOBS Act crowdfunding exemption and 
arguing that its fraud protections will rely on the disclosure requirements involving meaningful disclo-
sures). 
 197 Complaint at 2–3, FTC v. Chevalier, No. 3:15-cv-01029-AC (D. Or. June 10, 2015), 2015 WL 
3776613. 
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leged that he used that money for personal purposes and the participants never 
saw any reward or refund.198 
The JOBS Act addresses the increased risk of fraud by imposing liability 
on any issuer of crowdfunded securities who engages in fraudulent or decep-
tive disclosures.199 The liability provision of the Act provides investors in a 
securities crowdfunding campaign a remedy, either at law or in equity, to re-
cover the consideration paid for securities purchased from an issuer engaged in 
fraudulent activity.200 FINRA also uses its authority to police funding portals 
as a way to address some of the risks inherent to Internet-based securities 
sales.201 In November 2016, FINRA, for the first time, terminated the registra-
tion of a securities crowdfunding portal for failing to comply with the JOBS 
Act’s investor protection requirements.202 
B. JOBS Act Crowdfunding Illustrated 
In November 2016, Hopsters LLC, a startup craft brewery that offers a 
brew-your-own-beer experience, launched an equity crowdfunding campaign 
under the JOBS Act’s new rules.203 Hopsters used Wefunder, a FINRA-
                                                                                                                           
 198 Id. Chevalier announced that he was cancelling his campaign fourteen months after launching 
it, and promised that he would provide refunds to the investors. Id. at 1, 8–9. The FTC ultimately filed 
a complaint when investors did not see any refund, alleging that Chevalier had used the funds he 
raised with his crowdfunding campaign for personal reasons unrelated to his board game project. Id. at 
8–9. Chevalier and the FTC ultimately reached a settlement that prohibited Chevalier from benefitting 
from anything related to his Kickstarter campaign, and also imposed on Chevalier a $111,793.71 pen-
alty. Proposed Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 4–5, FTC v. 
Chevalier, No. 3:15-cv-01029-AC (D. Or. 2015), 2015 WL 4270382. 
 199 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c); Mashburn, supra note 8, at 151–57 (providing an overview of the 
JOBS Act’s liability provision, including an overview of Section 12(a)(2) in the Securities Act, from 
which the JOBS Act’s provision borrows language). 
 200 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(1)(A). The heightened risk of investor fraud presented by Internet 
crowdfunding, and the adequacy of the JOBS Act’s liability provisions, has attracted scholarly atten-
tion, but it is not the focus of this note. See generally, e.g., Baritot, supra note 9 (focusing on the risks 
of fraud in crowdfunding and how the SEC can best protect investors); Hazen, supra note 9 (discuss-
ing the risk of fraud presented by the Internet-based nature of the JOBS Act’s crowdfunding exemp-
tion, and arguing that adequate investor-protection will hinge on meaningful disclosure); Mashburn, 
supra note 8 (arguing that the liability provisions of the JOBS Act do not provide adequate protection 
for investors participating in crowdfunding campaigns). 
 201 See Ali Perry, FINRA Action Against Crowdfunding Platform, MOFO JUMPSTARTER (Dec. 16, 
2016), http://www.mofojumpstarter.com/finra/ [https://perma.cc/8WRN-5FVY] (discussing FINRA’s 
decision to terminate the registration of UFP, LLC, which was the first crowdfunding portal to be 
subject to termination). 
 202 See id. 
 203 See HOPSTERS, http://www.hopstersbrew.com/ [https://perma.cc/ACM8-P833] (home page for 
the Hopsters company website, inviting customers to “come try [their hand] at brewing”); Jessica 
Pham, Hopsters Brewery: The Fastest Reg CF Crowdfunding Ever, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Dec. 8, 
2016, 1:40 AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/12/93457-hopsters-brewery-fastest-reg-cf-
raise-crowdfunding-ever/ [https://perma.cc/KR7Y-CSKC] (providing an overview of the launch of the 
campaign, including the fact that it raised $615,000 in the first two weeks). 
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approved registered funding portal, to host its campaign.204 Under the cam-
paign, online investors could purchase preferred equity in the company for 
$500/unit, which entitles investors to a pro-rata distribution of 20% of Hop-
sters’ profits in perpetuity.205 The campaign webpage provided thorough details 
about the company, including its financial history, projections for future 
growth, and management structure.206 It also included a risk factor section and 
a feature that allowed potential investors to submit questions to the company’s 
management team.207 Further, the campaign webpage provided a link to the 
filing that the company submitted to the SEC in order to launch the cam-
paign.208 The form, called a Form C, provides a clear illustration of how the 
JOBS Act’s crowdfunding rules are executed in practice.209 The campaign hit 
its target, the maximum amount allowed under the JOBS Act, of $1 million 
and will use the funds to expand the business from its original Newton, Massa-
chusetts location into a new location in downtown Boston.210 
V. AMENDING THE JOBS ACT TO HELP DIVERSIFY  
THE STARTUP LANDSCAPE 
The crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act should be amended to in-
crease the annual amount that an entrepreneur can raise from crowdfunded secu-
rities from $1 million to $5 million.211 Crowdfunding is a revolutionary technol-
                                                                                                                           
 204 See Funding Portals We Regulate, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about/funding-portals-we-
regulate [https://perma.cc/6WUS-3VSM] (listing the registered funding portals); see also Invest in 
Hopsters, WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/hopsters [https://perma.cc/BDT3-WA2Z] (the Hopsters 
LLC equity crowdfunding campaign page). 
 205 See Invest in Hopsters, supra note 204. For an explanation of preferred stock see supra note 
50 and accompanying text. 
 206 Invest in Hopsters, supra note 204. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id.; see also Hopster’s LLC Form C, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1689082/
000167025417000007/documents_list.htm [https://perma.cc/RNL7-HQDV] (the Form C filing for 
Hopsters LLC equity crowdfunding campaign under the JOBS Act). 
 209 See Hopster’s LLC Form C, supra note 208 (providing the SEC with all of the disclosures 
mandated by Title III of the JOBS Act). 
 210 See Invest in Hopsters, supra note 204; see also Jessica Bartlett, Brew-Your-Own-Beer Startup 
Hopsters Pops Off New Crowdfunding Campaign, BOS. BUS. J. (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.biz
journals.com/boston/news/2016/11/17/brew-your-own-beer-startup-hopsters-pops-off-new.html 
[http://web.archive.org/web/20161123221732/http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2016/11/
17/brew-your-own-beer-startup-hopsters-pops-off-new.html] (providing an overview of Hopsters’ 
expansion plans). 
 211 See Equity Crowdfunding Improvement Act of 2014, H.R. 4564, 113th Cong. (2014) (pro-
posal to amend the JOBS Act that includes raising the annual cap on crowdfunded securities); Alois, 
supra note 24 (quoting Doug Ellenoff, a renowned investor, saying that the annual cap in Title III of 
the JOBS Act needs to be raised from $1 million to $5 million for the legislation to be useful for en-
trepreneurs). 
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ogy with the potential to disrupt the startup financing status quo, but entrepre-
neurs will need more than $1 million a year for that potential to be realized.212 
The capital gap in startup financing leaves early-stage entrepreneurs seek-
ing up to $2 million especially vulnerable to failure, but allowing entrepreneurs 
to raise up to $5 million a year through crowdfunded securities may mitigate that 
problem.213 Section A argues that crowdfunding technology has the potential to 
level the playing field within the startup financing ecosystem.214 Section B ar-
gues that the SEC can and should raise the annual cap on the crowdfunding ex-
emption from $1 million to $5 million because it is in the public interest to en-
courage entrepreneurship by making more capital available to the entrepreneurs 
disadvantaged by the traditional startup financing status quo.215 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See Bradford, supra note 22, at 5 (discussing the revolutionary nature of crowdfunding); 
Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1473 (“[C]rowdfunding enhances the possibility that an aspiring entrepre-
neur from a modest background and/or geographically remote region (for example, far from Silicon 
Valley) would find financial backers for her vision.”); Wroldsen, supra note 22, at 601 (discussing the 
transformative power of crowdfunding, and arguing that the JOBS Act wrongly forces the innovative 
technology of crowdfunding into a traditional regulatory scheme); Gubler, supra note 22 (“Crowd-
funding has the potential to revolutionize the financing of small business, transforming millions of 
users of social media . . . into venture capitalists, and giving life to valuable business ideas that might 
otherwise go unfunded.”). See generally LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 17 (providing an overview 
of how crowdfunding is a significant technological leap forward in the evolution of how startups fund 
themselves). The lack of diversity in startup financing illustrates the need to level the playing field. 
See BRUSH, supra note 17, at 7–8 (showing the disparity with which venture capital is distributed 
between female and male entrepreneurs); LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 17, at 65 (discussing gender 
inequality in venture capital); ORSER & ELLIOTT, supra note 17, at 1 (“[B]eing female is too often 
deemed an entrepreneurial handicap.”); Hay, supra note 17 (providing statistics that show how female 
and minority entrepreneurs are far less likely to receive traditional forms of startup financing); Leder, 
supra note 17 (discussing venture capitalists’ preference to be within an hour drive from the startups 
in which they invest); Sherry, supra note 86 (noting the stark racial inequality among entrepreneurs 
who received venture capital); see also Lennon, supra note 14 (noting that the average successful 
startup raises $41 million). 
 213 See Ibrahim, supra note 15, at 1417, 1445 n.209 (noting that the capital gap exists for entre-
preneurs looking to raise between $2 million and $5 million); Alois, supra note 24 (quoting a promi-
nent investor who believes that the JOBS Act needs to allow entrepreneurs to raise $5 million a year 
for the act to be useful); Mitra, supra note 15 (presenting the argument that crowdfunding may be able 
to help entrepreneurs bridge the startup gap); Zwilling, supra note 16 (estimating that the amount of 
capital that a startup will need to survive the capital gap is around $1 million, if not slightly more); see 
also Fisch, supra note 16, at 60, 63 (noting the unmet need for financing for new businesses, and 
stating that lack of capital is a top reason for failure among new businesses). 
 214 See infra notes 216–227 and accompanying text (arguing that crowdfunding has the potential 
to break the startup financing status quo). 
 215 See infra notes 228–235 and accompanying text (arguing that the SEC has the authority to 
raise the annual cap on the JOBS Act’s crowdfunding exemption). 
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A. Crowdfunding Technology Has the Potential to Mitigate Diversity 
Problems in Startup Financing 
Crowdfunding brings the power of social networking into the capital rais-
ing process.216 It therefore has the potential to mitigate the lack of diversity in 
startup financing by supporting affinity groups.217 An affinity group is a group 
of people who are linked by a common interest or purpose.218 Affinity groups 
have long been forming to support the kinds of entrepreneurs who have been 
left out of traditional startup financing systems, including women and minori-
ties.219 Examples include the Female Entrepreneur Association and Code2040 
(a support network for black and Hispanic entrepreneurs).220 The crowdfund-
ing exemption in the JOBS Act has the potential to capitalize on the phenome-
na of affinity groups by giving those and similar groups the power to provide 
serious amounts of capital, in addition to social support, to underrepresented 
entrepreneurs.221 
Having some connection to a venture capitalist or being able to network 
your way into a meeting with a venture capitalist has become an unwritten re-
quirement to securing venture capital financing.222 Entrepreneurs seeking ven-
ture capital, therefore, have to devote time, money, and energy toward getting 
                                                                                                                           
 216 See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 17, at ix, xiii (discussing how crowdfunding “shares a lot 
of social networking’s energy” and is “in the most simplistic terms, social networking meets venture 
financing”); Dell, supra note 23 (defining crowdfunding as being “one part social networking and one 
part capital accumulation”); Gubler, supra note 22 (discussing crowdfunding’s connection to social 
media). 
 217 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 242 (2006) (discussing affinity groups); 
LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 17, at 10–14 (discussing the power of affinity groups). 
 218 See Affinity Group, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/
american_english/affinity-group?q=affinity+group [https://perma.cc/ZFE2-RC3C]. 
 219 See Bates, supra note 93, at 155–56, 162–65 (describing groups and initiatives formed to sup-
port businesses founded by black entrepreneurs); Brush et al., supra note 19, at 141–44 (providing an 
overview of groups formed to support female entrepreneurs); Guynn, supra note 83 (discussing a new 
venture capital firm aimed at representing a more diverse pool of entrepreneurs). See generally 
CODE2040, http://www.code2040.org/ [https://perma.cc/TL5J-YY89] (providing a support network 
for Black and Hispanic entrepreneurs); FEMALE ENTREPRENEUR ASS’N, http://femaleentrepreneur
association.com/ [https://perma.cc/F6WG-HAGU] (providing a support network for female entrepre-
neurs). 
 220 See generally CODE2040, supra note 219; FEMALE ENTREPRENEUR ASS’N, supra note 219; 
MIDWESTERN ENTREPRENEURSHIP CONF., http://mwecomaha.com/ [https://perma.cc/9Z6P-YYBM] 
(providing a support network for entrepreneurs in the Midwestern United States). 
 221 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012) (exempting crowdfunded securities); see also LAWTON & 
MAROM, supra note 17, at 12–13 (discussing crowdfunding as a way to empower affinity groups). 
 222 See Brush et al., supra note 19, at 150–51 (discussing how “social network theory” has created 
networks of similar people in which venture capitalists mainly operate); Guynn, supra note 83 (dis-
cussing the “clubby” nature of venture capital financing); Iskold, supra note 19 (discussing how ven-
ture capitalists often perceive an entrepreneur’s ability to “hustle” his or her way into an introduction 
as a prerequisite for venture capital financing). 
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the attention of venture capitalists.223 This creates a serious disadvantage for 
entrepreneurs who cannot easily get in front of a venture capitalist, either be-
cause they are not tapped into a network of established entrepreneurs, or be-
cause they did not graduate from elite schools like MIT and Stanford.224 
Crowdfunding, because of its social networking roots, can mitigate that 
disadvantage by giving all entrepreneurs with an Internet connection equal ac-
cess to a source of capital.225 An entrepreneur, for example, who does not have 
a degree from Stanford and has had no opportunity to connect with a network 
of proven and elite entrepreneurs and venture capitalists can still have a great 
idea, but he or she is going to need more than $1 million a year to survive the 
capital gap and have a chance at competing with the entrepreneurs who do 
have those advantages.226 With $5 million a year, that entrepreneur may be 
able to survive the “valley of death,” and therefore have a better chance at at-
tracting the attention of traditional forms of startup financing.227 
                                                                                                                           
 223 See TEDESCO, supra note 48, at 3 (stating that the process through which an entrepreneur goes 
to attract venture capital can take from six to nine months of work with legal and financial profession-
als); Iskold, supra note 19 (providing insight into the time and effort that is generally required for an 
entrepreneur to attract venture capital financing); Jeremy Quittner, 4 Tips for Meeting with a Venture 
Capitalist, INC. (June 3, 2014), http://www.inc.com/jeremy-quittner/advice-for-meeting-with-venture-
capitalists.html [https://perma.cc/69MS-FX7M] (explaining the strategic considerations that entrepre-
neurs should think about if they are trying to attract venture capital financing). 
 224 See Bobbie Gossage, An Insider’s Guide to Venture Capital Financing, INC. (May 1, 2010), 
http://www.inc.com/magazine/20100501/an-insiders-guide-to-venture-capital-financing.html [https://
perma.cc/FFJ5-NKVJ] (discussing how entrepreneurs can overcome barriers to securing venture capi-
tal, including the disadvantage that entrepreneurs face when competing against entrepreneurs from 
MIT or Stanford); TrueBridge Capital, supra note 17 (showing that the top five represented schools 
among venture capitalists are Stanford, Harvard, Brown, Dartmouth and MIT). 
 225 See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 17, at ix, xiii (discussing how crowdfunding “shares a lot 
of social networking’s energy” and is “in the most simplistic terms, social networking meets venture 
financing”); Fisch, supra note 16, at 64 (discussing how Internet securities offerings can help connect 
more entrepreneurs with capital by reducing cost of connecting with traditional sources of capital); 
Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1473 (discussing how crowdfunding has the potential to give all entrepre-
neurs an equal chance at finding financing regardless of background or where they live in proximity to 
entrepreneurial hotspots like Silicon Valley); Dell, supra note 23 (defining crowdfunding as being 
“one part social networking and one part capital accumulation”); Gubler, supra note 22 (discussing 
crowdfunding’s connection to social media). 
 226 See Ibrahim, supra note 15, at 1417 (noting the capital gap that exists for entrepreneurs seek-
ing up to $2 million); Gossage, supra note 224 (pointing out the additional work that entrepreneurs 
must do if they did not graduate from an elite university); Lennon, supra note 14 (stating that the 
average successful startups has raised $41 million); TrueBridge Capital, supra note 17 (discussing the 
large population of venture capitalists from elite universities). 
 227 See Ibrahim, supra note 15, at 1417 (identifying the capital gap as existing for companies 
looking to raise up to $2 million); Mitra, supra note 15 (discussing the capital gap for entrepreneurs 
who are looking to raise $2 million or less); Zwilling, supra note 16 (citing crowdfunding as a way 
that entrepreneurs can survive the capital gap, or “valley or death”); see also Fisch, supra note 16, at 
60 (pointing out that lack of capital is second only to management error as the major cause for busi-
ness failure). 
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B. Raising the Annual Cap to $5 Million and Support for an Increased Cap 
The SEC has the authority to increase the cap on what an entrepreneur 
can raise through equity crowdfunding to $5 million annually.228 Section 3(b) 
of the Securities Act grants the SEC the authority to add new exemptions for 
offerings that do not exceed $5 million.229 The SEC can exercise this authority 
as long as it finds that limiting the crowdfunding exemption to something less 
than $5 million is not “necessary in the public interest and for the protection of 
investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of 
the public offering.”230 Section 28 of the Securities Act further grants the SEC 
the authority to make any exemption, with no limit on the dollar amount, from 
any provisions or rules under the Securities Act if such an exemption is “nec-
essary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection 
of investors.”231 
The SEC could appropriately raise the annual cap on crowdfunded securi-
ties to $5 million because, without changing the limits on how much each in-
dividual investor could invest in a year, investors’ exposure to risk would not 
be affected.232 Further, it would be in the public interest to raise the cap and 
allow more diverse entrepreneurs the opportunity to compete with their peers 
who are more likely to receive traditional forms of venture capital.233 An annu-
al cap of $5 million could lead to more of the “creative destruction” that bene-
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the economy, and noting the unmet need for capital to fund those businesses); Lennon, supra note 14 
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startup financing methods). See generally Hart, supra note 11, at 3 (discussing the importance of 
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2017] Raising the JOBS Act’s Crowdfunding Exemption 807 
fits our economy by spurring innovation and creating jobs.234 For the Act to 
realize this potential, however, Congress must first empower it do so.235 
CONCLUSION 
Entrepreneurial activity is beneficial to the American economy. It is diffi-
cult, however, for entrepreneurs to secure the financing that they need to 
launch their businesses. The demand for startup financing significantly out-
weighs supply. Further, because of the “old boy’s club” nature of the startup 
landscape, where the strength of an entrepreneur’s network is effectively as 
important as the strength of his or her idea, female and minority entrepreneurs 
receive a disproportionately low amount of capital from venture capitalists and 
angel investors. Crowdfunding has the potential to help underrepresented en-
trepreneurs finance their startups by tapping into a community of online inves-
tors. As of May 16, 2016, entrepreneurs have been able to raise up to $1 mil-
lion annually through crowdfunding securities pursuant to the crowdfunding 
exemption in Title III of the JOBS Act. This is good news for female and mi-
nority entrepreneurs, who may now be able to bypass the traditional sources of 
early-stage financing that have largely ignored them. Their businesses will 
need more than $1 million per year to survive, however, so Congress should 
amend the JOBS Act to raise the annual cap on the crowdfunding exemption to 
$5 million. Doing so may help empower a new crop of entrepreneurs to finally 
break the startup status quo. 
THOMAS MURPHY 
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